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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
law factor of the mixed issue may be readily separable. In this light it is
worth noting that in three of these cases the court was reversing the Board to
find for the claimant; in the fourth (Martin v. Plaut) the Court of Appeals was
faced with an affirmed finding from below so that only questions of law could
be considered. And it is generally held in compensation that inferential facts
are just as "factual" for review purposes as are evidentiary ones, E.g. Gordon
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 300 N. Y. 652, 90 N. E. 2d 898 (1950) (extreme
case).
The bare result of the principal decision is not noteworthy, considering the
prior "heart" cases, but the technique or review employed is significant, its
express adoption being highlighted by the failure of the court to cite even one
precedent for substantive authority. The courts are not thus abdicating their
decisive role as regards legal questions; rather they are placing increased reliance on the agency, and properly so, considering the remedial and largely
non-political nature of compensation and the record of honest administration
achieved by the Board.- Objectively considered, the decision means at least
that within the substantive limits defined by existing case law the Board's conclusion on the "accident" issue will control; very likely it means that the same
view will be taken when the Board ventures into uncharted areas beyond those
limits, a result to be welcomed. The limited review applied here may be a concomitant of the emphasis on casual relation already noted. The decision is not
surprising as there has been a growing tendency of the courts to discuss all
types of compensation issues in "fact" terms. This case, however, presents the
desirable review process in full form, worthy of careful consideration and
wide application.
Robert B. Fleming
TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - INTEREST IN LAW
PARTNERSHIP AS A CAPITAL ASSET
Max Swiren, member of a Chicago law firm, acquired by a series of purchases a 30% interest in the partnership for a net total outlay of some $18,000.
In 1944 he valued the interest at about $43,000, of which $35,000 represented
his allocable share of unpaid fees, billed and unbilled. Swiren sold his interest
that year for $40,000. In filing his income tax return for 1944, on a cash receipt basis, he reported as capital gain the sale price less his investment. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue contended that the amount received was
ordinary income. The Tax Court, after allowing taxpayer to recover his capital
investment tax-free, held that so much of the remaining consideration as represented unpaid fees was ordinary income. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals reversed (2-1), holding that the partnership interest was a
capital asset and the gain a capital gain. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d
656 (7th Cir. July 1950), cert. denied 340 U. S. 912, 71 S. Ct. 293 (Jan. 1951).

RECENT DECISIONS
Here, for the first time, an interest in a professional partnership was held
to be a capital asset for income tax purposes. There are conflicting views as to
the manner in which partnerships are treated: whether to treat them as an
entity separate from their members, or as a joint ownership by the member
partners in all of the firm's assets. If a partnership is to be treated as an
entity, then a partnership interest can be treated as a capital asset within the
definition of § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, and any gain or loss realized
upon its sale is to be characterized as a capital gain or loss. If it is to be
treated as a joint ownership, then upon the sale of a partnership interest an
interest is sold in each and every asset of the partnership in which event the
sale of a partnership interest should result in the same tax treatment as the
sale of a sole proprietorship. See Williams v. McGowan, 132 F. 2d 570 (2d
Cir. 1945). Thus each asset of the partnership would have to be classified as
to whether it was a capital asset or not and if a capital asset its holding period
determined; in addition, the cost basis of each would have to be computed,
together with the portion of the total purchase price allocable to it. The bookkeeping problems would be great in any case, and in many partnerships
almost insuperable.
The Internal Revenue Code does not limit itself to a single theory of law
in its treatment of partnerships. See Brooks, The Strange Nature of the Partnership Under the Income Tax Law, 5 TAx L. REv. 35 (1949). The partnership
is treated as an entity without regard to its owners in its business operations,
but once the partnership casts its accounts and determines the profit or loss for
the particular accounting period, then the individual partners-not the partnership-are taxed on their respective distributive shares, whether or not the
profits have been distributed. It is in large measure due to this dual concept
of a partnership, as a separate entity for some purposes and a'joint ownership
for others, that tax problems as in the instant case have arisen.
Swiren v. Commissioner, the principal case, follows a line of cases in the
Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals holding that, for purposes of the federal
income tax laws at least, a sale of a partnership interest is a sale of an interest
in a separate entity and that such interest is a capital asset. These decisions
all dealt with trading partnerships. Unnecessary complications in this field
arose because of the inconsistent positions taken by the Commissioner in his
attempts to protect the revenue. Thus, when a claim was made that the sale of
a partnership interest resulted in a capital gain rather than an ordinary one,
the Commissioner contended that such income was ordinary and thus taxable in
full. H. R. Smith v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 398, aff'd, 173 F. 2d 470 (5th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 818; United States v. Landreth, 164 F. 2d
340 (5th Cir. 1947); Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F. 2d 532 (6th Cir. 1942).
But where the sale resulted in a loss, the Commissioner switched his position
arguing that the loss was a capital loss, instead of ordinary; he was as success-
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ful in this latter argument as he was unsuccessful in the former. McClellan
v. Commissioner, 117 F. 2d 988 (2d Cir. 1941); Stilgenbauer v. United States,
115 F. 2d 283 (9th Cir. 1940); Estate of Lowenstein, 12 T. C. 694 (1949). At
the present time, then, the courts recognize a partnership as something separate and distinct from the members, and an interest therein as a capital asset
within the definition of § 117 of the Code. Thus it readily follows that a sale
of that interest constitutes the sale of a capital asset and that the holding period
is measured from the date of acquisition of the partnership interest and not
from the time when the partnership assets were acquired. Commissioner v.
Lehman, 165 F. 2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 819.
Finally, on May 15, 1950, the General Counsel of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, confronted by these consistent decisions, issued G. C. M. 26379,
holding that the sale of a partnership interest should be treated as the sale of
a capital asset. He was careful, however, to exclude sales in "form and appearance" only, where the "substance" of the transaction was a distribution of
past earnings. He seized upon the distinction declared by the courts in the
few cases dealing with professional partnerships. Hervering v. Smith, 90 F.
2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937) ; McAfee v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 720 (1947) ; cf. Doyle
v. Commissioner, 102 F. 2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939), (dealing with the sale of an
interest in a single fee). In those cases, emphasis was laid on the underlying
assets of the partnerships, the bulk of which, in the case of a professional
partnership, must of necessity consist of uncollected fees. The courts reasoned
that since these fees would eventually have become ordinary income, any payments made for giving up an interest in them represented the partner's share
of past earnings, and thus ordinary income. See McClellan v. Commissioner,
117 F. 2d 998 (2d Cir. 1941).
Valid arguments may exist for the treatment of every sale of a partnership
interest as giving rise to ordinary income. However, in view of the frequent
holdings that an interest in some'partnerships is a capital asset, there can be
no valid reason for denying such treatment to one type of partnership and
allowing it to another. If a partnership interest is something separate, it has
that status regardless of the underlying assets comprising the partnership. The
further distinction that what the retiring partner receives in a professional
parnership is a share of past earnings should not exist. Receivables and cash
make up a part of the assets of a trading partnership; yet in cases dealing
with sales -of interests in such partnerships, the courts have never attempted
to segregate such assets. See H. R. Smith, (10 T. C. 398) supra, where cash,
notes and accounts receivable constituted approximately 42% of the total
assets. In the decision, this fact was not even considered by the Tax Court.
When the appellate courts, despite the Commissioner's opposition, declared
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that the sale of a trading partnership interest was the sale of a capital asset,
the Commissioner frequently petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari in
order to get a final adjudication on the subject. Certiorari was denied each
time. This consistent refusal has been construed to signify that the Supreme
Court refuses to disturb the lower court decisions. See United States v.
Shapiro, 178 F. 2d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1949). The refusal of the Court to grant
certiorari in the Swiren case could also be viewed in the same light which ,if
true, means that the Supreme Court sees no distinction between trading partnerships and professional partnerships. But see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's strong
statement that denial of certiorari implies no approval of lower court decisions,
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S.9 12, 917-920 (1950).
Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue- may continue to attack the
sale of interests in professional partnerships, the form of the transaction may
be important. Care should be taken so that all facts point to the sale of an
interest, rather than to a termination of the partnership.
Henry Woicicki
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DEVISE OF FOREIGN REALTY
RENVOI EXPRESSLY ADOPTED

-

Testator, a naturalized American citizen, died while domiciled in New
York, leaving real property in his native-Switzerland. His devise of this property was valid by New York internal law, but invalid in part by Swiss internal
law, because of compulsory heirship in near relatives. The realty was sold
and proceeds transmitted to New York. Held: The devise is valid. Decedent
Estate Law § 47, in referring the question of validity of a devise to the law of
situs, means all of that law, including its principles of conflict of laws. Swiss
conflict law would in this case refer validity to the internal law of decedent's
nationality. The proceeds are to be distributed as the realty would have been,
i.e. by New York internal law. In re Schneider'sEstate, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 652, on
reargument, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
'When a forum has decided that some aspect of the case should be dealt
with in view of the law of a particular foreign jurisdiction, it may refer to the
purely internal, domestic law of that jurisdiction; or, in the interest of uniformity of decision, i.e. to reach the same resultwhich other courts, including
the foreign court, would reach, it may refer to all of the law of the foreign
jurisdiction, incuding its principles of conflict of laws. If it makes the broader
reference, it adopts the so-called "renvoi" theory.
Renvoi has not suffered for lack of interest on the part of legal writers.
Those who oppose it focus their arguments upon the difficulty which may be
encountered in ascertaining a foreign conflict rule, and upon the possibility
that these problems are more theoretical than real, and that, in any event, the
to the conflict rule of some other jurisdiction which in turn refers to the conflict
rule of the forum, with supposedly endless reference and re-reference. See,
e.g., Cormack, Characterization,Localization and Preliminary Question in the
49

